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MORTGAGES-CONTRIBUTION-RIGHT OF SURVIVING TENANT BY THE EN-

his wife
held title to certain land as tenants by the entirety. Shortly before decedent's
death they jointly incurred an indebtedness of $8000 secured by a mortgage
on such land. The proceeds of the loan were used to improve the mortgaged

TIRETY TO CONTRIBUTION FOR JOINT MORTGAGE DEBT-Decedent and
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property. After decedent's death his widow, having succeeded to full ownership of the mortgaged land, claimed that she was entitled to contribution
from decedent's estate for one-half of the joint mortgage debt upon the
property. On the executors' petition for a final distribution decree the
lower court denied the widow's right to contribution from the estate. On
appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Decedent's estate must contribute one-half of the mortgage debt. The right of contribution is an attribute of joint liability flowing directly from the debt itself, and it does
not depend upon a common interest in the land mortgaged to secure
such debt. In re Keil's Estate, (Del. 1958) 145 A (2d) 563.
There is a sharp conflict of authority as to whether a surviving spouse
who discharges a joint mortgage debt on property held by the entirety
has a right of contribution against the deceased spouse's estate. The problem usually arises when the proceeds of the mortgage loan are used for the
benefit of the jointly held property.1 One view, allowing contribution,
proceeds on the theory that decedent's estate has been benefited by the
payment of the joint obligation because it satisfied a claim against the
estate.2 Liability to contribute is consequently based on the rule that when
a joint obligation is discharged by only one obligor, he should receive from
the other obligors what he has paid on their behalf.a Emphasis is placed
on the joint debt as the source of the common burden giving rise to contribution.4 The other view proceeds on the theory that the mortgage lien
is the source of a common burden upon the co-obligors, and because the
lien, no longer affects decedent's estate when the entire title to the land
passes to the surviving spouse, contribution is denied.5 The land is said
to oe the primary fund for the payment of the debt and therefore carries
the entire burden of payment to the surviving spouse.a Comparison of the
two views indicates that the point upon which the courts are divided is
the question whether the payment of the joint debt benefited the non-paying
obligor in such a manner as to require contribution. Contribution rests
1 In the usual case the land held by the entirety is encumbered with a "purchase
money" mortgage. See the cases cited in notes 2 and 5 infra. However, where the proceeds of the mortgage loan are used to improve the property, as in the principal case, substantially the same problem is presented. In both situations the entire benefit of the loan
inures to the surviving spouse.
2 In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A. (2d) 209 (1951); Underwood v. Ward, 239
N.C. 513, 80 S.E. (2d) 267 (1954); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444
(1929). See comment, 32 BoST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 253 (1952). See also Magenheimer v.
Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919), holding that where the estate paid a
joint debt secured by a mortgage on property held by the entirety the estate was entitled
to contribution from the widow.
3Eliason v. Eliason, 3 Del. Ch. 260 at 263 (1869); Brown v. Brown, 58 Ariz. 333, 119 P.
(2d) 938 (1941 ).
4 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, note 2 supra, at 447.
5 Lopez v. Lopez, (Fla. 1956) 90 S. (2d) 456; Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E.
870 (1927); Geldhart v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 209 App. Div. 581, 205 N.Y.S. 238
(1924). See also note, 13 UNIV. PIIT. L. R.Ev. 763 (1951).
6 See Lopez v. Lopez, note 5 supra, at 459.
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upon the equitable principle that one shall not be made to bear more
than his just share of a common burden to the advantage of his coobligors;7 it therefore appears to be essentially a payment for the benefit conferred on the non-paying obligor. In the typical joint debt situation
the advantage which the courts find conferred on the non-paying coobligor appears in one of two forms. It can be found in either the proceeds of the debt which each co-obligor presumably receives,8 or in the
discharge of an obligation for which each co-obligor is primarily liable.9
In most cases the non-paying obligor is substantially benefited in both
ways.1° In the principal case, however, it would seem that neither of these
benefits is sufficiently present to afford an equitable basis for contribution. The widow alone obtained all the benefits of the proceeds of the
joint debt by succeeding to ownership of the improved land.11 While the
decedent was benefited by the use of the improvements acquired with the
proceeds of the joint debt during his lifetime, the right to contribution
could not arise before satisfaction of the joint obligation,12 when the entire benefits of the debt proceeds had passed to the paying obligor. The
majority of the court in the principal case, however, found a benefit in
the fact the estate was discharged from primary liability on the joint debt.18
But while the removal of a legally enforceable claim against the estate is
clearly of some benefit to it, such a benefit does not seem sufficiently substantial to warrant the application of equitable contribution doctrines.
Since the value of the mortgaged land in the principal case was admittedly
more than enough to satisfy the debt there is little likelihood any claim
would ever be asserted against the estate. The benefit to the estate therefore is in large part illusory. On the other hand, in the event of default the
widow is likely to lose the land of which she is now sole owner. It would
seem then that the discharge of the debt is of far greater importance to
the widow than it is to her husband's estate. The likelihood that the

7 See McKelroy v. Hamilton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 130 S.W. (2d) lll4; Asylum of St.
Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N.Y. 375, 146 N.E. 632 (1925). Contribution is an
equitable doctrine and must be applied according to the equities of the parties involved.
Hoverson v. Hoverson, 216 Minn. 228 at 235, 12 N.W. (2d) 501 (1943); Carey v. McCaslin,
(Ohio App. 1942) 43 N.E. (2d) 519; Lorimer v. Julius Knack Coal Co., 246 Mich. 214 at
217, 224 N.W. 362 (1929); 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., 157 (1941).
s In re McGlinn's Estate, 55 Montg. (Pa.) 5 at 10 (1939); Maresh v. Jennings, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) 38 S.W. (2d) 406.
9 See Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E. (2d) 788 (1957). Cf. Kennedy v. Camp,
14 N.J. 390, 102 A. (2d) 595 (1954).
10 Waters v. Waters, IIO Conn. 342 at 345, 148 A. 326 (1929).
11 See Rell v. Combes, 25 Ohio App. 476, 159 N.E. 133 (1927), finding that the duty
to contribute ceases when all the proceeds of the joint debt have passed to the paying
obligor. Similarly, it has been held that the measure of liability to contribute is determined by the proportionate interest of each obligor in the proceeds of the joint debt. See
Maresh v. Jennings, note 8 supra.
12 Gafford v. Tittle, 224 Ala. 605 at 608, 141 S. 653 (1932); Dennig v. Meckfessel, 303
Mo. 525 at 530, 261 S.W. 55 (1924).
13 Principal case at 565.
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mortgage would be foreclosed in the event of default means the widow has
received not only the proceeds of the debt but the practical burden of its
payment as well. To base the right to contribution in such circumstances
solely on the fact of discharge of legal liability is to make the doctrine of
contribution one of form rather than substance.14

Stevan Uzelac, S.Ed.

14 See Rell v. Combes, note 11 supra, where the court refused to make legal liability
alone the test for determining the question of contribution.

